On the rise of nationalist parties and declining birth rates resulting in Islamophobia

On the rise of nationalist parties and declining birth rates

We can no longer ignore the rise of nationalist parties across democracies worldwide — including the far-right AfD’s election win in Germany’s Saxony-Anhalt state — spreading from the US to Italy, Japan, Colombia, India, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and beyond, where right-leaning governments have taken power. The exact percentage isn’t certain yet, but this could become the political “Zeitgeist” of the coming decade.

It’s easy to point to global geopolitical shifts or migration from the developing world as the cause, but these are only external factors. If there’s one internal weakness (in most countries) to point to, it’s the falling birth rate.

Falling births, shrinking populations. As lifestyles change, birth rates have become insufficient, and populations are declining in many countries. A consequence is an insufficient healthy working-age population — not enough manpower to keep a nation’s social and economic machinery running. The growing share of elderly people needing pensions and social services places heavier weight on the working population that has to support them.

Some governments then accept migrants, citing labor shortages — Spain’s current socialist-government policy is one example. There’s also a benefit: cheap labor from new migrants lowers production costs and helps keep consumer prices down. This tends to be more visible in Asian countries less concerned with human rights. In Europe, when undocumented migrants also receive equal access to the social safety net, native citizens grow angry, feeling their share is being divided up.

Either way, if a country’s own population growth stayed high enough to absorb the smaller inflow of migrants, the problem wouldn’t grow this large. It’s really because of the internal weakening — the stalling birth rate — in most current democracies that external factors have become something to fear. One could conclude that this fearful reaction is what’s strengthening nationalist, populist right-wing movements.

Nigeria’s births alone now outnumber all of Europe’s combined — the huge youth population set to emerge from there is pushing hard into Europe, where declining populations have opened up space, in search of jobs and better lives. And it may get worse: Thailand’s TFR is now around 1, which is making Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam nervous about the coming population pressure. In fact, Myanmar’s own population is heading toward outright decline, not just stagnation. Unless the trajectory changes, there will be difficulties ahead.

China, having overshot with its one-child policy, now worries about its population problem too. With the inverted “4-2-1” family pyramid — one adult eventually responsible for caring for 2 parents and up to 4 grandparents — the burden has grown heavier. As the available workforce shrinks, labor costs rise, hurting China’s global competitiveness; a shrinking population also means falling demand, slowing the economy. The Chinese government has been cutting taxes and boosting subsidies, like Western countries, to try to lift the birth rate back up — but without much visible success so far.

Fertility decline is spreading even to countries that used to have very high birth rates. Even Bangladesh — the country Myanmar people often point to as “overpopulated” — has now fallen to a fertility rate near or below the replacement level of 2.1, and is expected to peak and start declining before long. The countries where birth rates remain high are now mostly confined to parts of Africa and a handful of Asian countries.

This shift in population balance will also affect domestic and regional geopolitics — power balances can shift, and internal competition within countries can intensify. Within a single country, whichever ethnic or religious group grows its population share will see its influence rise significantly — and this is true both in democracies and in non-democratic systems.

Even in an age of AI, a group of people with IQs over 160 can’t become “immortal” simply through intelligence — without leaving descendants, only the descendants of those who did reproduce will go on to shape the world. Unless genetic “copy-paste” human cloning becomes possible, that story doesn’t change — and we’re not there yet.

Women’s lives aren’t only about having children — they contribute value across many other important roles in society. But there is still no more basic, fundamental task in the world than passing humanity’s lineage on unbroken to the next generation.

We’re now seeing nationalist and right-wing parties gaining power worldwide, tightening immigration policy under “our country first” slogans. But unless these policies also succeed in raising the domestic birth rate, whatever policy they choose will be hard to make truly effective.

[Image: comparing population pyramids of Chad — Africa’s highest birth rate — and South Korea — one of the world’s lowest. Sourced from Wikipedia.]

#Augustus_Linn — September 9, 2026

References for the checkable claims above:

AfD’s Saxony-Anhalt win (43.8–44% of the vote, more than double 2021’s result): NPR, Al Jazeera
Nigeria is projected to have had more births in 2025 than all of Europe combined, at roughly 7.6 million versus Europe’s 6.3 million — Visual Capitalist / UN World Population Prospects Visual Capitalist
Bangladesh’s fertility rate in 2026 is estimated at about 2.09 children per woman, just below the 2.1 replacement threshold — Measured World / UN WPP Measured World
China’s “4-2-1” family structure and its old-age support burden: European Journal of Ageing (Jiang & Sánchez-Barricarte, 2011)

I wish to add that it is also the cause of Islamphobia because it is not because of Hatred of Muslims and Islam but the migrant population in USA and EU, UK are mostly Muslims and so they have to scare the rising Muslim Migrants. In Myanmar After

While official census numbers report the Muslim population at roughly 2.3% to 4.3%, independent demographers, international monitoring organizations, and local religious leaders widely agree that these numbers have been heavily suppressed. [1, 2, 3, 4]

Independent scholars and community-based surveys estimate the true, unofficial Muslim population is between 10% and 15% of the country. Based on a total national population of approximately 55 million, this equals 5.5 to 8.2 million people. This trajectory establishes Muslims as the second-largest religious demographic in Myanmar, vastly outnumbering Christians if grouped cohesively. [1, 2, 3]

Note: Detailed official census breakdowns by specific ethnicity have largely been withheld or remain sensitive, so these figures represent broad consensus estimates from demographic organizations and the CIA World Factbook. [1]

If you’d like, I can provide details on:

The geographic distribution of these groups
Their primary religious affiliations
Specific sub-ethnic tribes within the Chin or Kachin communities

Independent scholars and community-based surveys estimate

the true, unofficial Muslim population is between 10% and 15% of the country.

Based on a total national population of approximately 55 million, this equals 5.5 to 8.2 million people.

This trajectory establishes Muslims as the second-largest religious demographic in Myanmar, vastly outnumbering Christians if grouped cohesively. [1, 2, 3]

Myanmar’s Muslim population is not monolithic but is fractured by the state into several sub-racial and ethnic categories: [1, 2]

Major National Races and Estimated Populations

Bamar (Burman): ~37.5 million (68%)
- The dominant ethnic group living primarily in the central plains and major cities. [1]
Shan: ~5.0 million (9%)
- The largest ethnic minority group, centered mainly in Shan State. [1, 2]
Karen (Kayin): ~3.9 million (7%)
- Reside mostly in the southeastern border regions and delta areas. [1]
Rakhine (Arakanese): ~2.2 million (4%)
- Predominant in western coastal Rakhine State. [1]
Chinese (Burmese-Chinese): ~1.7 million (3%)
- Concentrated heavily in urban centers and northern border areas. [1]
Mon: ~1.1 million (2%)
- One of the oldest groups, located in the south near Mon State and Tanintharyi. [1, 2]
Indian (Burmese-Indian): ~1.1 million (2%)
- Largely centered in commercial hubs like Yangon. [1]
Chin: ~1.1 million (2%)
- Located in western mountainous Chin State, encompassing dozens of diverse sub-tribes. [1]
Kachin: ~0.8 million (1.5%)
- Located in the far north, comprising multiple linguistic sub-groups. [1]
Kayah (Karenni): ~0.3 million (0.5%)
- Located in Kayah State in the east.