By Union Solidarity and Development Party – Facebook, Fair use, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?curid=58719167
By National League for Democracy, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5254085
Understanding the USDP—and imagining a different political future for Myanmar
MMNN English | Edited by ChatGPT
When discussing Myanmar’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), it is tempting to look only at its formal creation as a political party in 2010.
But a deeper look at its history raises a more important question:
Where did the political idea and institutional culture behind the USDP come from?
A recent analysis by Myanmar writer Min Thay, published on 23 September 2026, argues that the roots of the USDP should be examined through the history of the word and concept of kyant-kai-yay—“solidarity”—and through the political thinking of former military leader Senior General Than Shwe.
Some parts of Min Thay’s argument concern intentions that are difficult to independently verify. Nevertheless, his historical starting point deserves attention.
From “Solidarity” to the USDP
The word kyant-kai-yay—solidarity—has a much older political history in Myanmar than the USDP itself.
During General Ne Win’s caretaker government of 1958–1960, the Union of Myanmar Solidarity Association was established in October 1958. According to historian Ye Htut’s study published by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, the organization was composed of senior civil servants and military officers and initially presented itself as a social organization rather than a political party. By 1962 it had expanded into a very large nationwide network.
This historical association is significant because the same solidarity concept later reappeared in the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), established in 1993 under the military government.
In 2010, the USDA was transformed into the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).
Contemporary U.S. Congressional research records that the USDP formally applied for registration on 29 April 2010, with then-Prime Minister U Thein Sein among those submitting the application. The USDA’s assets were subsequently transferred to the new party.
Therefore, the USDP did not simply appear overnight in 2010.
It inherited an organizational and ideological lineage that reached back through the USDA to an earlier “solidarity” organization established during the Ne Win caretaker period.
That historical continuity does not, by itself, prove that every institution or leader involved had identical intentions.
But it does help explain why the USDP has traditionally been closely associated with the military establishment and the state apparatus.
Min Thay’s central argument
Min Thay goes further.
He argues that Senior General Than Shwe should be regarded as an important figure in understanding the USDP’s development and suggests that the organization was conceived not merely as an ordinary political party but as part of a longer-term political structure in which the military would retain an important guardianship role.
According to this interpretation, the evolution was approximately:
social organization → mass organization → political party → governing party → long-term political institution.
Min Thay further suggests that Than Shwe envisaged the USDP remaining an important governing force for decades, possibly as far as 2050.
This particular claim about a 2050 objective—or a deliberate forty-year ruling-party plan—is an attributed interpretation, rather than something for which I would presently claim definitive documentary proof.
Nevertheless, the broader historical observation is worth examining.
The USDP was created at precisely the moment when Myanmar was moving from direct military rule toward a constitutional system containing both elected civilian institutions and constitutionally protected military roles.
The transition therefore did not simply mean:
Military disappears → civilians take complete control.
It created a much more complicated hybrid political structure.
Why create a civilian political vehicle?
Min Thay’s most interesting argument concerns the changing international environment.
Direct military government became increasingly difficult to legitimize internationally in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
A military institution could therefore seek influence through institutions that appeared civilian and electoral while retaining important constitutional and political relationships with the armed forces.
There is considerable historical evidence for the close institutional relationship between the USDP and the former military government.
The USDP won a very large parliamentary majority in the controversial 2010 elections, while the NLD did not participate. In 2015, however, the political picture changed dramatically: the NLD won 255 of 330 elected seats in the People’s Assembly and 135 of 168 elected seats in the National Assembly, while the USDP won 30 and 11 respectively.
Those results demonstrated something politically fundamental:
A party’s institutional strength does not automatically equal popular electoral strength.
And that brings us back to U Thein Sein.
The opportunity that might have been
After the overwhelming NLD victory in the 1990 election and the NLD’s strong performance in the 2012 by-elections, the political reality was becoming difficult to ignore.
In 1990, the NLD won 392 of the 485 contested seats.
In 2012, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD again demonstrated substantial popular support.
At that moment, U Thein Sein had an unusual opportunity.
Instead of seeing the NLD principally as a threat to the existing political order, what if he had seen it as a potential partner?
What if the USDP had said:
“We do not have to destroy the NLD, and the NLD does not have to destroy us.”
What if Myanmar’s two most powerful political currents had begun negotiating a genuine national partnership?
The son returning with the golden pot
There is a beautiful image in the famous Thu Wanna Thar Ma Jataka: the son returns home carrying the golden pot.
Perhaps Myanmar also needed such a political return.
Rather than repeating confrontation, U Thein Sein could have attempted something unprecedented:
to turn an apparent political threat into a national asset.
He could have invited Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD into a genuine political partnership.
Several possibilities could have been explored.
1. Daw Suu as Prime Minister
If constitutionally possible, the government could have considered constitutional amendments allowing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to serve as Prime Minister.
2. Constitutional reform concerning the presidency
Another possibility would have been to amend the constitutional provisions that prevented Daw Suu from becoming President.
Article 59(f) of the 2008 Constitution contained restrictions relating to foreign citizenship of a presidential candidate’s spouse and children, provisions that directly affected Daw Suu’s eligibility.
3. A powerful advisory position
If immediate constitutional change were impossible, Daw Suu could have been given a formally recognized advisory role with substantial responsibility for national policy.
4. A genuine power-sharing arrangement
U Thein Sein could have remained President while establishing a mechanism through which the elected political leadership of the NLD participated meaningfully in national decision-making.
5. A coalition cabinet
NLD representatives could have entered government alongside USDP members and representatives of other political parties.
The objective would not have been for one side to surrender to the other.
It would have been to create a shared government based on cooperation.
Why should the USDP disappear?
This is perhaps the most important question raised by the combined argument.
Even if the NLD possessed enormous popular support, should the political organization associated with the military establishment simply disappear?
Likewise, should the NLD be expected to surrender its democratic mandate simply because the military and its political allies possessed institutional power?
Neither approach offered an obvious path toward national reconciliation.
Myanmar needed—and still needs—a political system in which different institutions can coexist without treating one another as enemies that must ultimately be eliminated.
The NLD brought a powerful democratic mandate.
The USDP brought connections to a powerful state and military establishment, along with experience within the government machinery.
The military remained an enormous institution that could not simply be wished away.
The challenge was therefore to find a constitutional and political framework in which these realities could coexist under civilian democratic principles.
Democracy and stability need not be enemies
There is an important distinction between supporting democracy and ignoring the importance of stability and security.
Likewise, recognizing the importance of national security does not require rejecting democracy.
A sustainable Myanmar political settlement would need to address both.
The NLD’s democratic legitimacy could contribute to:
- accountable government;
- political representation;
- international engagement;
- economic cooperation;
- foreign investment;
- institutional reform.
The military and USDP’s participation could potentially contribute to:
- institutional continuity;
- administrative experience;
- security concerns;
- knowledge of government machinery;
- engagement with the military establishment.
But such cooperation would require something much more difficult than a coalition agreement:
mutual trust.
The NLD would need confidence that cooperation would not become another mechanism for restricting democracy.
The military and USDP would need confidence that democratic political change would not become a campaign of revenge against the military institution or its personnel.
And both sides would need to accept that Myanmar belongs to all its citizens.
The real question about the USDP
Min Thay concludes that we should not simply dismiss the USDP as “the military’s political party” and stop thinking.
Whether one accepts that characterization or not, his broader warning is important:
The USDP has been a significant political institution in modern Myanmar, and anyone trying to understand Myanmar’s political trajectory must understand its origins, organizational structure and relationship with the military establishment.
The historical record shows a clear institutional lineage:
1958 — Union of Myanmar Solidarity Association
↓
1993 — Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA)
↓
2010 — Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
That history deserves serious study rather than slogans.
At the same time, historical continuity should not be confused with proof of every alleged long-term intention.
The claim that Senior General Than Shwe specifically intended the USDP to remain a ruling party until 2050 requires documentary evidence before it can be treated as established fact.
That distinction matters.
Could the road have been different?
Looking back from today, the most interesting question is not simply:
Who was right?
Nor:
Who should have defeated whom?
The more constructive question is:
Could Myanmar’s political leaders have found a way for the NLD, USDP, military and ethnic political forces to coexist within a genuinely democratic Union?
Perhaps the greatest political achievement would not have been the victory of one side over another.
It would have been the creation of a system in which no side needed to fear the permanent destruction of the other.
The NLD would remain.
The USDP would remain.
Ethnic political parties would remain.
The military would remain as a national institution, but within an agreed constitutional order.
And the people would ultimately determine their government through credible elections.
That would have been a very different Myanmar.
Perhaps that is why the old image of the son returning with the golden pot remains so powerful.
The golden pot need not belong to the NLD.
It need not belong to the USDP.
It should belong to Myanmar.
UNITY IN DIVERSITY
Democracy without revenge.
Stability without domination.
Security without fear.
Political competition without annihilation.
Reconciliation without humiliation.
That is the kind of political settlement Myanmar has repeatedly struggled to achieve.
And it is precisely why the history of both the NLD and the USDP deserves to be understood—not merely celebrated or condemned.
What Do the People Really Want?
Perhaps the most important question is not “Who should rule Myanmar?”
For ordinary people, including the Muslims of Myanmar and all our ethnic nationalities, the answer may be much simpler.
We do not care who governs us—provided that the government genuinely delivers what the people need:
PEACE.
STABILITY.
PROGRESS.
JUSTICE.
RULE OF LAW.
A GOVERNMENT FREE FROM CORRUPTION.
DEMOCRACY.
People want to live without fear.
They want to work, study, travel, worship, raise their children and build their communities in peace.
They want equal citizenship and equal protection under the law.
They want their children and grandchildren to inherit a better Myanmar—not another generation of war, hatred, displacement and political revenge.
Therefore, the ultimate test of any government should not simply be who occupies the presidential palace, who controls the parliament, or which party wins an election.
The real test should be:
Can the government bring peace, justice, stability, development, clean government, rule of law and meaningful democracy to ALL the people of Myanmar?
If it can, the people will have reason to support it.
If it cannot, changing the name of the ruling party will not solve Myanmar’s fundamental problems.
For Muslims of Myanmar, for Buddhists, Christians and other faith communities, and for the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Mon, Rakhine, Shan, Ta’ang, Wa, Bamar and all other peoples of our Union, the ultimate objective should be the same:
A peaceful, prosperous, just and democratic Myanmar where every citizen can live with dignity.
Who rules is important.
How they rule is more important.
And how the people live is most important of all.
UNITY IN DIVERSITY.
Myanmar belongs to all of us.
The Son Returning with the Golden Pot: A Different Path for U Thein Sein and Myanmar
An MMNN proposal from the perspective of the 2012 political opening
The overwhelming victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 general election—and its remarkably strong performance in the April 2012 by-elections—should have sent a clear political message to every major political force in Myanmar.
In 1990, the NLD won 392 of the 485 seats contested, roughly 81 percent of the seats. The military government did not allow those election results to translate into a transfer of power. More than two decades later, the 2012 by-elections again demonstrated the extraordinary popular support enjoyed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.
Therefore, U Thein Sein might reasonably have considered an alternative to returning to the old strategy of suppressing the NLD and Daw Suu.
Such a reversal could have produced renewed domestic confrontation and international criticism. Instead, why not think outside the box?
There is a beautiful image in the famous Thu Wanna Thar Ma Jataka: the son returns home carrying the golden pot.
Perhaps Myanmar also needs such a moment—a political leader who chooses reconciliation rather than confrontation, and who turns an apparent political problem into an opportunity for national cooperation.
Let the NLD and USDP coexist—and cooperate
We would like to see both major political forces continue to exist and participate peacefully in Myanmar’s political life:
- Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, representing the enormous democratic mandate demonstrated through elections;
- the military-affiliated USDP, representing a political organization closely connected with the country’s military establishment and its experience of administration and security.
The answer need not be the destruction of one side by the other.
The answer could be cooperation.
I would therefore propose that U Thein Sein consider an unprecedented political arrangement: bringing the USDP into a genuine political partnership with the NLD and, where constitutionally possible, developing a coalition government based on mutual respect and public mandate.
This would not mean that either party had to disappear.
It would mean that both sides accept that Myanmar is bigger than any political party.
What could U Thein Sein have offered?
To demonstrate genuine goodwill, several possibilities could have been considered.
1. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as Prime Minister
If necessary, the Constitution could be amended to create such a possibility.
2. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as President
Again, this would require constitutional change. Article 59(f) of the 2008 Constitution imposed restrictions concerning foreign citizenship of a candidate’s spouse and children, a provision widely understood to have prevented Daw Suu from becoming president.
3. A powerful official advisory position
If the constitutional obstacles could not immediately be overcome, Daw Suu could have been given a formally recognized and politically meaningful advisory role, with clearly defined authority and responsibility.
4. U Thein Sein could remain President while accepting the political leadership’s mandate
Another possibility would have been for the President to remain in office while establishing a genuine mechanism through which the elected political leadership of the NLD could participate in determining major national policies.
5. A coalition cabinet
The government could have included substantial numbers of NLD representatives alongside members of the USDP and other political parties, creating a government based on cooperation rather than confrontation.
A long-term political partnership?
There could even have been discussion of a long-term agreement under which the USDP retained its organizational identity while cooperating with the NLD within a broader democratic framework.
The USDP could have continued to nominate its own members, while both sides agreed on mechanisms for cooperation, power-sharing and national development.
Such an arrangement would not require either side to surrender its identity.
It would require both sides to recognize a simple principle:
Myanmar belongs to all its citizens—not to one party, one institution, one ethnic group or one generation.
Why should Myanmar need both sides?
Myanmar’s democratic forces have long demanded democracy, accountable government, civil liberties and greater international engagement.
At the same time, Myanmar could not simply ignore the country’s military institution, its security responsibilities, administrative experience and organizational capacity.
The challenge, therefore, was not necessarily to choose between democracy and stability.
The greater challenge was to find a political system in which democracy and stability could reinforce one another.
A genuine accommodation between the NLD and the military establishment could potentially have reduced fear on both sides.
The NLD could contribute its enormous popular legitimacy.
The military-linked political establishment could contribute institutional experience and knowledge of the state machinery.
Together, they could have worked toward:
Democracy + Good Governance + Stability + Security + Investment + National Reconciliation.
That would require compromise from everyone.
The NLD would have to reassure the military that democratic government did not mean revenge or humiliation.
The military and USDP would have to reassure the people that political reform did not mean another attempt to restrict the democratic mandate.
And both sides would have to accept that no political institution can permanently govern against the wishes of the people.
The road not taken
History eventually took a very different course.
But looking back at the political opening of 2011–2012, one can still ask:
What if U Thein Sein had chosen an even more ambitious reconciliation strategy?
What if, instead of asking how to contain Daw Suu and the NLD, the question had been:
“How can we bring Daw Suu, the NLD, the USDP and the military establishment into one political process for the benefit of the whole country?”
Perhaps the greatest political victory would not have been for the NLD.
Nor would it have been for the USDP.
It would have been for Myanmar itself.
The golden pot would belong to the whole country.
UNITY IN DIVERSITY.
DEMOCRACY WITH STABILITY.
JUSTICE WITHOUT REVENGE.
RECONCILIATION WITHOUT HUMILIATION.
That could have been the meaning of the son returning with the golden pot.
မင်းသေ့
ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီ၏ အညမည ပစ္စယသတ္တိ
_____________________________________
၂၀၂၆ ၊ စက်တင်ဘာ ၊ ၂၃
မင်းသေ့
ပြည်ထောင်စုကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးပါတီ [USDP] အကြောင်း ရေးတော့မယ်ဆိုရင်၊ နဂိုမူလအစ ဖြစ်တည်လာရာ ရင်းမြစ်အယူအဆကို တူးဆွကြည့်ဖို့ လိုပါတယ်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးပါတီ [USDP] (တနည်း) ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီဟာ ဘယ်လို အသွင်ပုံစံမျိုးနဲ့ ပေါ်ထွက်လာတဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီမျိုးဖြစ်သလဲ။ ဒီမေးခွန်းကို ပို၍ နက်နက်ဖြေနိုင်ဖို့အတွက် – စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်ဟောင်း အဖြစ် အငြိမ်းစားယူသွားတဲ့ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး သန်းရွှေရဲ့ စဉ်းစားချက်တွေကို ထည့်သွင်း မတွက်ဆလို့ မဖြစ်နိုင်ပါဘူး။
• ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး သန်းရွှေဟာ – ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီကို ဘယ်လို ပုံစံမျိုးနဲ့ မြင်တွေ့ချင်ခဲ့သလဲ။
• တနည်းအားဖြင့် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး သန်းရွှေဟာ – ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီကို ဘယ်လို ပါတီအင်စတီကျူးရှင်းမျိုးအဖြစ် အနာဂတ်အခင်းအကျင်းကို ထည့်တွက်စဉ်းစားခဲ့သလဲ။
• ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီကရော – ဘယ်လောက်အထိ ခွန်စိုက်အားစိုက်ဖြစ်ဖြစ် နိုင်ငံရေးကစားကွင်းမှာ ဝင်ရောက်ခြယ်လှယ်ကြီးစိုးဖို့ ရည်မှန်းထားပါသလဲ။
ဒီမေးခွန်းတွေဟာ ခက်သလိုလိုနဲ့ အဖြေထုတ်ဖို့ လွယ်နေသလို၊ အဖြေထုတ်ဖို့ လွယ်မလိုလိုနဲ့ တကယ်ဖြေဖို့ ခက်နေတာတွေလည်း ရှိပါတယ်။
⦿ နောင်လာမယ့် ၂၀၅၀ အထိ
၁။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးသန်းရွှေဟာ – မြန်မာ့တပ်မတော်ကို ဗဟိုပြု စဉ်းစားချက်ပေါ်မှာ အခြေခံခဲ့ပါတယ်။ တပ်မတော် အင်အားရှိမှ၊ တိုင်းပြည် အင်အားရှိမယ်ဆိုတာကို ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး သန်းရွှေဟာ တကယ်ယုံခဲ့တယ်လို့ ယူဆနိုင်စရာ အကြောင်းများစွာ ရှိပါတယ်။ ဒါ့ကြောင့် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး သန်းရွှေရဲ့ စဉ်းစားချက် ဗဟိုအူတိုင်ဟာ မြန်မာ့တပ်မတော်အပေါ်မှာ အုတ်မြစ်တည်ထားတယ်လို့ ဆိုနိုင်မှာပါ။ တကယ်တော့ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီကို ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ဖို့ ဆိုတာဟာ – ကနဦးအစောပိုင်းကာလမှာကတည်းက မျှော်ရည်မှန်းချက် ရှိထားပြီးဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဆင့်ကဲဖြစ်စဉ်နည်းနဲ့ တရွေ့ရွေ့ချင်း အသွင်ပြောင်းတည်ဆောက်တဲ့နည်းကို ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးသန်းရွှေက သုံးခဲ့တယ်လို့ ယူဆပါတယ်။ လူမှုအရပ်ဘက် အသင်းအဖွဲ့အဖြစ်ကနေ ပါတီအဖြစ်၊ ပါတီအဖြစ်ကနေ အစိုးရအဖြစ်၊ အစိုးရအဖြစ်ကနေ တိုင်းရေးပြည်မှုကိစ္စတွေကို ဂါးဒီးယန်းအနေနဲ့ နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ဆက်လက် အုပ်ထိန်းမယ့် အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်ရပါတီအဖြစ်။ အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်ရပါတီ ဆိုတာကို ruling party လို့ အနက်ဖွင့်နိုင်ပါတယ်။ ပိုပြီး တိတိကျကျ ညွှန်းဆိုရရင်၊ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးသန်းရွှေဟာ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီကို ဘယ်အချိန်အထိ ruling party အဖြစ် မြင်ချင်ခဲ့တာလဲ။ နောင်လာမယ့် ၂၀၅၀ ခုနှစ်အထိပါ။
⦿ စာဖတ်သူကြီး၏ ဩဇာ
၂။ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီ [USDP] ဟာ – “ကမန်းကတန်း စုဖွဲ့လေ့ကျင့်ပေးခံရပြီး ပေါ်ထွက်လာတဲ့ ပါတီမျိုး” မဟုတ်ပါဘူး။ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီဟာ ပါလီမန်ဒီမိုကရေစီခေတ်မှာ ပေါ်ခဲ့ဖူးတဲ့ လူမှုလှုပ်ရှားမှုတစ်ခုရဲ့ သမိုင်းအမွေနဲ့ ဆက်သွယ်ခဲ့တယ်။ ထို့နောက် လူမှုအရပ်ဘက်အသင်းအနေနဲ့ စစ်ဘက် – အရပ်ဘက်အကြား ဆက်ဆံရေးကွင်းပြင်တစ်ခုဖြစ်အောင် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်း အသွင်နဲ့ စုဖွဲ့ အခြေတည်လာခဲ့တယ်။ ထို့နောက် ချိန်သားကိုက်မယ့်ကာလမှာ၊ ချက်ချင်းလက်ငင်း နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီတစ်ခုအဖြစ်ကို အသွင်ပြောင်းဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့တယ်။ ထို့နောက် သိပ်မကြာခင်မှာပဲ၊ အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်ရ အရပ်သားပါတီအသွင်အနေနဲ့ ပုံပြောင်းဖြစ်တည်လာခဲ့တယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် ၂၀၁၀ ကနေ ၂၀၅၀ ခုနှစ်အထိ – ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီဟာ မိမိကိုယ်ကို ruling party အဖြစ် ရပ်တည်ရှင်သန်ဖို့၊ ကာယကံမြောက် အားထုတ်လာတဲ့ ဝိသေသလက္ခဏာတွေကို အထင်အရှားတွေ့နေရပါတယ်။ ဒါတွေဟာ ဘယ်အထိုင်က လာသလဲ။
• မုချ ဧကန် စင်စစ် လာရာ ရေသောက်မြစ်ဟာ –
• ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးသန်းရွှေရဲ့ အမြော်အမြင်ဆီက ဆင်းသက်ပါတယ်။
ပရိုဒီမိုကရေစီအင်အားစုတွေအကြား “စာဖတ်သူကြီး” လို့၊ နာမည်ပြောင်နဲ့ ပညတ်ခံရတဲ့ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး သန်းရွှေဟာ – ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်လို လူထုထိပ်သီးခေါင်းဆောင်မျိုးကတောင် အထင်မသေးဝံ့တဲ့လူ တစ်ယောက်ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ “အန်ကယ်ရှင့်…” ဆိုပြီး၊ အစချီထားတဲ့ ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်ရဲ့ လက်ရေးမူ စာတစ်စောင်ကို၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုက မေ့လောက်သေးမယ်လို့ မထင်ပါဘူး။ ၂၀၁၀ ခုနှစ်မှာ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီအဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်တဲ့ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီကို “ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးသန်းရွှေဟာ နောင် နှစ်ပေါင်း (၄၀) လောက်အထိ၊ ruling party အဖြစ် လေးနက်သော ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ထားခဲ့တယ်” လို့၊ တိကျသော စစ်ဘက်ရင်းမြစ်ကနေ၊ နားလည်ခွင့်ရခဲ့ပါတယ်။ လက်ရှိ တည်ဆဲကာလမှာ၊ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီရဲ့ လှုပ်ရှားမှု သွင်ပြင်တွေဟာ – ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ခြေလှမ်းကျဲကျဲ၊ အုပ်စုအား တောင့်တောင့်နဲ့ လှမ်းချီနေတဲ့ အုပ်စုအင်အားကို အထင်အရှားပြသနေပါတယ်။
⦿ တပ်ဗဟိုပြု စဉ်းစားချက်
၃။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး သန်းရွှေဟာ ပြောင်းလဲလာတဲ့ ကမ္ဘာ့အခင်းအကျင်းကို ဆုပ်မိကိုင်မိရှိခဲ့တယ်လို့ ယူဆနိုင်ပါတယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလို တတိယနိုင်ငံငယ်လေးအဖို့၊ စစ်ဘက်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးနဲ့ ထင်ထင်ပေါ်ပေါ် မသွားသင့်တော့ဘူးလို့ ယူဆခဲ့ဟန်ရှိပါတယ်။ သို့သော်လည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလို နိုင်ငံမျိုးမှာ၊ ခိုင်မာကျစ်လစ်တဲ့ မြန်မာ့တပ်မတော်လို – စစ်တပ်အင်စတီကျူးရှင်းရဲ့ ထိန်းချုပ်မှု မရှိရင်၊ တိုင်းပြည်ဟာ ဗြဲလရမ်းကြီးဖြစ်သွားမယ်လို့ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးသန်းရွှေက စဉ်းစားခဲ့ပါတယ်။ မြန်မာ့တပ်မတော်ဟာ – တိုင်းပြည်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအပေါ်မှာ အစဉ်တစိုက် အုပ်စီးထိန်းချုပ်ထားနိုင်မှသာ – တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းတဲ့ တိုင်းပြည်အဖြစ် ရှိနေမယ်လို့၊ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးသန်းရွှေက ယုံကြည်ခဲ့ဟန်တူပါတယ်။ ဒါ့ကြောင့်လည်း တပ်ဗဟိုပြု စဉ်းစားချက်အပေါ်မှာ အခြေပြုပြီး၊ ပေါ်လာရတဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးအခင်းအကျင်း (တနည်း) မူဘောင် / စနစ်တွေကို စနစ်တကျ တည်ဆောက်ခဲ့တယ်လို့ ယူဆရပါတယ်။ ဒီလို စဉ်းစားချက်အထိုင်ရဲ့ ရလဒ်ဟာ – ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီရဲ့ ဖြစ်ထွန်းပေါ်ပေါက်မှုကို ကျေးဇူးပြုနေပါတယ်။ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီဟာ – ၂၀၁၀ နဲ့ ၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ်အကြားမှာ – တပ်နဲ့ ပူးတုံခွာတုံရှိတယ်လို့ ထင်ခဲ့ရပေမယ့်၊ တပ်ဟာ ပါတီကို အစဉ်တစိုက် ownership ယူဖို့ အားထုတ်ခဲ့တာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီအတွင်းမှာ ဘယ်လိုပဲ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအပြောင်းအလဲ၊ ခေါင်းဆောင်အပြောင်းအလဲမျိုး ရှိခဲ့သည်ဖြစ်စေ၊ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီဟာ – တပ်က စစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ခေါင်းဆောင်တွေ ownership အပြည့်အဝ ကိုင်ထားတဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီတစ်ခုဖြစ်တာ ထင်ရှားလာပါတယ်။ ကမ္ဘာပေါ်မှာ စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ခေတ်မစားတော့တာကို၊ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးသန်းရွှေက ကြိုတင် တွက်ဆနိုင်ခဲ့တယ်လို့ နားလည်ရပါတယ်။ ဒါ့ကြောင့် အရပ်ဘက် အသွင်နဲ့၊ တပ်ထိန်းချုပ်မှုအောက်က လွတ်ထွက်မသွားသော အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးစနစ်တစ်ခု ရဖို့ – တဆင့်ချင်း၊ တဖြည်းဖြည်းချင်း၊ တရွေ့ရွေ့ချင်း၊ တလှမ်းချင်း ချဲ့ထွင်တည်ဆောက်လာတာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။
⦿ စစ်ဘက်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှ — /
၄။ စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဟာ ကမ္ဘာကြီးမှာ ရေပန်းမစားတော့ပါဘူး။ ဒါ့အပြင် လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်နဲ့ တကိုယ်တော်ဝါဒ ကြီးထွားကျယ်ပြန့်လာတဲ့ လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းမျိုးမှာ၊ စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဟာ ဖန်စီ မဖြစ်တော့ပါဘူး။ ဒါ့အပြင် စစ်ဘက်က တိုက်ရိုက်အုပ်ချုပ်တာဟာ – ကြီးမားတဲ့ အဖိုးအခတွေ ပေးရပါတယ်။ အထူးသဖြင့် ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာပါ။ အုပ်ချုပ်သူအစိုးရဟာ – ပြည်သူလူထုအကြားမှာ “ရွံကြောက်ကြီးသဖွယ်” ထင်မြင်ခံလာရတာပါ။ တစ်ဖက်မှာလည်း နိုင်ငံတကာဇာတ်ခုံမှာ လူထုတရားဝင်မှုကို ပြနိုင်တဲ့ အစိုးရတစ်ရပ် မဟုတ်လို့၊ လူရာမဝင်တာမျိုးတွေ ရှိလာပါတယ်။ စစ်ဘက်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဟာ ၂၁ ရာစုမှာ – မျက်နှာမွဲအစိုးရစနစ်အဖြစ် ပုံပေါ်လာရပါတယ်။ တစ်ဖက်မှာလည်း နိုင်ငံရေးအရ ကစားနိုင်ဖို့ အကန့်အသတ်ရှိပါတယ်။ တရားဝင်မှု အကန့်အသတ်တွေလည်း ပုံစံမျိုးစုံနဲ့ ကြုံရပါတယ်။ ဒါ့ကြောင့် အရပ်သားခေါင်း ဆောင်းထားတဲ့၊ တပ်က ဂါးဒီးယန်းလုပ်နိုင်မယ့် ကြားခံ အင်စတီကျူးရှင်းတစ်ခု လိုလာပါတယ်။ ဒီ့အတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးသန်းရွှေ အကြီးအမှူးပြုခဲ့တဲ့ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီဟာ – ၂၀၁၀ ကနေ စပြီး၊ အရေးပါတဲ့ အင်စတီကျူးရှင်းတစ်ခုအဖြစ် မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေးအခင်းအကျင်းမှာ အတိအကျ ပေါ်လာပါတော့တယ်။
⦿ တည်ဆဲ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီ
၅။ ကျနော်တို့ အနေနဲ့ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီကို “စစ်တပ်ရဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီ” တစ်ခုဖြစ်တယ်လို့၊ ခပ်ရှင်းရှင်း သတ်မှတ်လိုက်ပြီး ယူဆလက်ခံထားလို့တော့ မရနိုင်ပါဘူး။ လက်တွေ့ မြေပြင်နဲ့၊ လက်တွေ့ အခင်းအကျင်းမှာ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီရဲ့ အခန်းကဏ္ဍဟာ – ကျနော်တို့ ထင်ထားတာထက် ပိုနေပါတယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေးလားရာကို တွက်ဆဖို့အတွက် ကြိုက်ကြိုက် / မကြိုက်ကြိုက်၊ ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီရဲ့ ရွေ့လျားဖြစ်တည်ဖြတ်သန်းလာမှုကို စိတ်ဝင်တစားလေ့လာကြရပါမယ်။
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