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<\/figure>\n\n\n\nUnderstanding the USDP\u2014and imagining a different political future for Myanmar<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
MMNN English | Edited by ChatGPT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n When discussing Myanmar’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), it is tempting to look only at its formal creation as a political party in 2010.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But a deeper look at its history raises a more important question:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Where did the political idea and institutional culture behind the USDP come from?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A recent analysis by Myanmar writer Min Thay<\/strong>, published on 23 September 2026, argues that the roots of the USDP should be examined through the history of the word and concept of kyant-kai-yay<\/em>\u2014\u201csolidarity\u201d\u2014and through the political thinking of former military leader Senior General Than Shwe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Some parts of Min Thay’s argument concern intentions that are difficult to independently verify. Nevertheless, his historical starting point deserves attention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The word kyant-kai-yay<\/em>\u2014solidarity\u2014has a much older political history in Myanmar than the USDP itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During General Ne Win’s caretaker government of 1958\u20131960, the Union of Myanmar Solidarity Association<\/strong> was established in October 1958. According to historian Ye Htut’s study published by the ISEAS\u2013Yusof Ishak Institute, the organization was composed of senior civil servants and military officers and initially presented itself as a social organization rather than a political party. By 1962 it had expanded into a very large nationwide network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This historical association is significant because the same solidarity<\/em> concept later reappeared in the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA)<\/strong>, established in 1993 under the military government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2010, the USDA was transformed into the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Contemporary U.S. Congressional research records that the USDP formally applied for registration on 29 April 2010, with then-Prime Minister U Thein Sein among those submitting the application. The USDA’s assets were subsequently transferred to the new party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the USDP did not simply appear overnight in 2010.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It inherited an organizational and ideological lineage that reached back through the USDA to an earlier \u201csolidarity\u201d organization established during the Ne Win caretaker period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That historical continuity does not<\/strong>, by itself, prove that every institution or leader involved had identical intentions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But it does help explain why the USDP has traditionally been closely associated with the military establishment and the state apparatus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Min Thay goes further.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He argues that Senior General Than Shwe should be regarded as an important figure in understanding the USDP’s development and suggests that the organization was conceived not merely as an ordinary political party but as part of a longer-term political structure in which the military would retain an important guardianship role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to this interpretation, the evolution was approximately:<\/p>\n\n\n\n social organization \u2192 mass organization \u2192 political party \u2192 governing party \u2192 long-term political institution.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Min Thay further suggests that Than Shwe envisaged the USDP remaining an important governing force for decades, possibly as far as 2050.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This particular claim about a 2050 objective\u2014or a deliberate forty-year ruling-party plan\u2014is an attributed interpretation<\/strong>, rather than something for which I would presently claim definitive documentary proof.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nevertheless, the broader historical observation is worth examining.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The USDP was created at precisely the moment when Myanmar was moving from direct military rule toward a constitutional system containing both elected civilian institutions and constitutionally protected military roles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The transition therefore did not simply mean:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Military disappears \u2192 civilians take complete control.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n It created a much more complicated hybrid political structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Min Thay’s most interesting argument concerns the changing international environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Direct military government became increasingly difficult to legitimize internationally in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A military institution could therefore seek influence through institutions that appeared civilian and electoral while retaining important constitutional and political relationships with the armed forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is considerable historical evidence for the close institutional relationship between the USDP and the former military government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The USDP won a very large parliamentary majority in the controversial 2010 elections, while the NLD did not participate. In 2015, however, the political picture changed dramatically: the NLD won 255 of 330 elected seats in the People’s Assembly and 135 of 168 elected seats in the National Assembly, while the USDP won 30 and 11 respectively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Those results demonstrated something politically fundamental:<\/p>\n\n\n\n A party’s institutional strength does not automatically equal popular electoral strength.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n And that brings us back to U Thein Sein.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After the overwhelming NLD victory in the 1990 election and the NLD’s strong performance in the 2012 by-elections, the political reality was becoming difficult to ignore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1990, the NLD won 392 of the 485 contested seats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2012, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD again demonstrated substantial popular support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At that moment, U Thein Sein had an unusual opportunity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead of seeing the NLD principally as a threat to the existing political order, what if he had seen it as a potential partner?<\/p>\n\n\n\n What if the USDP had said:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe do not have to destroy the NLD, and the NLD does not have to destroy us.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What if Myanmar’s two most powerful political currents had begun negotiating a genuine national partnership?<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is a beautiful image in the famous Thu Wanna Thar Ma Jataka<\/strong>: the son returns home carrying the golden pot.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps Myanmar also needed such a political return.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rather than repeating confrontation, U Thein Sein could have attempted something unprecedented:<\/p>\n\n\n\n to turn an apparent political threat into a national asset.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n He could have invited Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD into a genuine political partnership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Several possibilities could have been explored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If constitutionally possible, the government could have considered constitutional amendments allowing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to serve as Prime Minister.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another possibility would have been to amend the constitutional provisions that prevented Daw Suu from becoming President.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Article 59(f) of the 2008 Constitution contained restrictions relating to foreign citizenship of a presidential candidate’s spouse and children, provisions that directly affected Daw Suu’s eligibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If immediate constitutional change were impossible, Daw Suu could have been given a formally recognized advisory role with substantial responsibility for national policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n U Thein Sein could have remained President while establishing a mechanism through which the elected political leadership of the NLD participated meaningfully in national decision-making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n NLD representatives could have entered government alongside USDP members and representatives of other political parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The objective would not have been for one side to surrender to the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would have been to create a shared government based on cooperation<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is perhaps the most important question raised by the combined argument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even if the NLD possessed enormous popular support, should the political organization associated with the military establishment simply disappear?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Likewise, should the NLD be expected to surrender its democratic mandate simply because the military and its political allies possessed institutional power?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Neither approach offered an obvious path toward national reconciliation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Myanmar needed\u2014and still needs\u2014a political system in which different institutions can coexist without treating one another as enemies that must ultimately be eliminated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The NLD brought a powerful democratic mandate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The USDP brought connections to a powerful state and military establishment, along with experience within the government machinery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The military remained an enormous institution that could not simply be wished away.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The challenge was therefore to find a constitutional and political framework in which these realities could coexist under civilian democratic principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is an important distinction between supporting democracy<\/strong> and ignoring the importance of stability and security<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Likewise, recognizing the importance of national security does not require rejecting democracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A sustainable Myanmar political settlement would need to address both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The NLD’s democratic legitimacy could contribute to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The military and USDP’s participation could potentially contribute to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n But such cooperation would require something much more difficult than a coalition agreement:<\/p>\n\n\n\n mutual trust.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The NLD would need confidence that cooperation would not become another mechanism for restricting democracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The military and USDP would need confidence that democratic political change would not become a campaign of revenge against the military institution or its personnel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And both sides would need to accept that Myanmar belongs to all its citizens<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Min Thay concludes that we should not simply dismiss the USDP as \u201cthe military’s political party\u201d and stop thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether one accepts that characterization or not, his broader warning is important:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The USDP has been a significant political institution in modern Myanmar, and anyone trying to understand Myanmar’s political trajectory must understand its origins, organizational structure and relationship with the military establishment.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The historical record shows a clear institutional lineage:<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1958 \u2014 Union of Myanmar Solidarity Association<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2193<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1993 \u2014 Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2193<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2010 \u2014 Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n That history deserves serious study rather than slogans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, historical continuity should not be confused with proof of every alleged long-term intention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The claim that Senior General Than Shwe specifically intended the USDP to remain a ruling party until 2050 requires documentary evidence before it can be treated as established fact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That distinction matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Looking back from today, the most interesting question is not simply:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who was right?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Nor:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who should have defeated whom?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The more constructive question is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Could Myanmar’s political leaders have found a way for the NLD, USDP, military and ethnic political forces to coexist within a genuinely democratic Union?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Perhaps the greatest political achievement would not have been the victory of one side over another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would have been the creation of a system in which no side needed to fear the permanent destruction of the other<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The NLD would remain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The USDP would remain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ethnic political parties would remain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The military would remain as a national institution, but within an agreed constitutional order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And the people would ultimately determine their government through credible elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That would have been a very different Myanmar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps that is why the old image of the son returning with the golden pot<\/strong> remains so powerful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The golden pot need not belong to the NLD.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It need not belong to the USDP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It should belong to Myanmar.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Democracy without revenge. That is the kind of political settlement Myanmar has repeatedly struggled to achieve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And it is precisely why the history of both the NLD and the USDP deserves to be understood\u2014not merely celebrated or condemned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps the most important question is not \u201cWho should rule Myanmar?\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n For ordinary people, including the Muslims of Myanmar and all our ethnic nationalities<\/strong>, the answer may be much simpler.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We do not care who governs us\u2014provided that the government genuinely delivers what the people need:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n PEACE. People want to live without fear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They want to work, study, travel, worship, raise their children and build their communities in peace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They want equal citizenship and equal protection under the law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They want their children and grandchildren to inherit a better Myanmar\u2014not another generation of war, hatred, displacement and political revenge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the ultimate test of any government should not simply be who occupies the presidential palace, who controls the parliament, or which party wins an election.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The real test should be:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Can the government bring peace, justice, stability, development, clean government, rule of law and meaningful democracy to ALL the people of Myanmar?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n If it can, the people will have reason to support it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If it cannot, changing the name of the ruling party will not solve Myanmar’s fundamental problems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Muslims of Myanmar, for Buddhists, Christians and other faith communities, and for the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Mon, Rakhine, Shan, Ta’ang, Wa, Bamar and all other peoples of our Union, the ultimate objective should be the same:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who rules is important. UNITY IN DIVERSITY.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Myanmar belongs to all of us.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n An MMNN proposal from the perspective of the 2012 political opening<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The overwhelming victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 general election\u2014and its remarkably strong performance in the April 2012 by-elections\u2014should have sent a clear political message to every major political force in Myanmar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1990, the NLD won 392 of the 485 seats contested, roughly 81 percent of the seats. The military government did not allow those election results to translate into a transfer of power. More than two decades later, the 2012 by-elections again demonstrated the extraordinary popular support enjoyed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, U Thein Sein might reasonably have considered an alternative to returning to the old strategy of suppressing the NLD and Daw Suu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such a reversal could have produced renewed domestic confrontation and international criticism. Instead, why not think outside the box?<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is a beautiful image in the famous Thu Wanna Thar Ma Jataka<\/strong>: the son returns home carrying the golden pot.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps Myanmar also needs such a moment\u2014a political leader who chooses reconciliation rather than confrontation, and who turns an apparent political problem into an opportunity for national cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We would like to see both major political forces continue to exist and participate peacefully in Myanmar’s political life:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The answer need not be the destruction of one side by the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The answer could be cooperation<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I would therefore propose that U Thein Sein consider an unprecedented political arrangement: bringing the USDP into a genuine political partnership with the NLD and, where constitutionally possible, developing a coalition government based on mutual respect and public mandate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This would not mean that either party had to disappear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would mean that both sides accept that Myanmar is bigger than any political party<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To demonstrate genuine goodwill, several possibilities could have been considered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as Prime Minister<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n If necessary, the Constitution could be amended to create such a possibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as President<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Again, this would require constitutional change. Article 59(f) of the 2008 Constitution imposed restrictions concerning foreign citizenship of a candidate’s spouse and children, a provision widely understood to have prevented Daw Suu from becoming president.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. A powerful official advisory position<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n If the constitutional obstacles could not immediately be overcome, Daw Suu could have been given a formally recognized and politically meaningful advisory role, with clearly defined authority and responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4. U Thein Sein could remain President while accepting the political leadership’s mandate<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Another possibility would have been for the President to remain in office while establishing a genuine mechanism through which the elected political leadership of the NLD could participate in determining major national policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 5. A coalition cabinet<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The government could have included substantial numbers of NLD representatives alongside members of the USDP and other political parties, creating a government based on cooperation rather than confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There could even have been discussion of a long-term agreement under which the USDP retained its organizational identity while cooperating with the NLD within a broader democratic framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The USDP could have continued to nominate its own members, while both sides agreed on mechanisms for cooperation, power-sharing and national development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such an arrangement would not require either side to surrender its identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would require both sides to recognize a simple principle:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Myanmar belongs to all its citizens\u2014not to one party, one institution, one ethnic group or one generation.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Myanmar’s democratic forces have long demanded democracy, accountable government, civil liberties and greater international engagement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, Myanmar could not simply ignore the country’s military institution, its security responsibilities, administrative experience and organizational capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The challenge, therefore, was not necessarily to choose between democracy and stability<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The greater challenge was to find a political system in which democracy and stability could reinforce one another<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A genuine accommodation between the NLD and the military establishment could potentially have reduced fear on both sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The NLD could contribute its enormous popular legitimacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The military-linked political establishment could contribute institutional experience and knowledge of the state machinery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Together, they could have worked toward:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Democracy + Good Governance + Stability + Security + Investment + National Reconciliation.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n That would require compromise from everyone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The NLD would have to reassure the military that democratic government did not mean revenge or humiliation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The military and USDP would have to reassure the people that political reform did not mean another attempt to restrict the democratic mandate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And both sides would have to accept that no political institution can permanently govern against the wishes of the people<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n History eventually took a very different course.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But looking back at the political opening of 2011\u20132012, one can still ask:<\/p>\n\n\n\n What if U Thein Sein had chosen an even more ambitious reconciliation strategy?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n What if, instead of asking how to contain Daw Suu and the NLD, the question had been:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cHow can we bring Daw Suu, the NLD, the USDP and the military establishment into one political process for the benefit of the whole country?\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Perhaps the greatest political victory would not have been for the NLD.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nor would it have been for the USDP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would have been for Myanmar itself<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The golden pot would belong to the whole country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n UNITY IN DIVERSITY. That could have been the meaning of the son returning with the golden pot<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\nFrom \u201cSolidarity\u201d to the USDP<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Min Thay’s central argument<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Why create a civilian political vehicle?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The opportunity that might have been<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
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The son returning with the golden pot<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
1. Daw Suu as Prime Minister<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
2. Constitutional reform concerning the presidency<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
3. A powerful advisory position<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
4. A genuine power-sharing arrangement<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
5. A coalition cabinet<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Why should the USDP disappear?<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Democracy and stability need not be enemies<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
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The real question about the USDP<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Could the road have been different?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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UNITY IN DIVERSITY<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Stability without domination.
Security without fear.
Political competition without annihilation.
Reconciliation without humiliation.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nWhat Do the People Really Want?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
STABILITY.
PROGRESS.
JUSTICE.
RULE OF LAW.
A GOVERNMENT FREE FROM CORRUPTION.
DEMOCRACY.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
A peaceful, prosperous, just and democratic Myanmar where every citizen can live with dignity.<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How they rule is more important.
And how the people live is most important of all.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Son Returning with the Golden Pot: A Different Path for U Thein Sein and Myanmar<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Let the NLD and USDP coexist\u2014and cooperate<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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What could U Thein Sein have offered?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A long-term political partnership?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Why should Myanmar need both sides?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The road not taken<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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DEMOCRACY WITH STABILITY.
JUSTICE WITHOUT REVENGE.
RECONCILIATION WITHOUT HUMILIATION.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\u1019\u1004\u103a\u1038\u101e\u1031\u1037<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n