{"id":7572,"date":"2026-09-07T11:41:28","date_gmt":"2026-09-07T11:41:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/myanmarmuslim.news\/en\/?p=7572"},"modified":"2026-09-07T12:31:27","modified_gmt":"2026-09-07T12:31:27","slug":"is-fragmenting-rights-claims-by-sub-group-the-right-strategy-the-case-for-and-against","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/myanmarmuslim.news\/en\/2026\/09\/07\/is-fragmenting-rights-claims-by-sub-group-the-right-strategy-the-case-for-and-against\/","title":{"rendered":"Is fragmenting rights-claims by sub-group the right strategy? \u2014 the case for and against"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The author hopes Myanmar’s various ethnic groups fighting for separate rights won’t end up fragmenting the country into many small self-administered units \u2014 townships and districts \u2014 the way partition problems arose historically (e.g., the geographic separation between former East and West Pakistan, or India’s narrow corridor connecting its Northeast states, with Nepal and Bhutan also dependent on India for outside access). The author notes that even if Rohingyas obtained a self-administrative zone in the Mayu district, it would likely draw opposition from Bamar and Rakhine communities and lack agreement even among other ethnic minorities \u2014 and it would isolate Rohingyas from Myanmar’s wider Muslim population, who are Myanmar’s largest minority after the Bamar majority but are dispersed across the country (concentrated in Mandalay, Sagaing, Yangon, and Mawlamyine).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Phyo Win Latt (1st comment):<\/strong> If every small identity and sub-identity gets picked apart and argued over individually, it leads to claims like “there’s no such thing as a Kachin people” \u2014 only Jinghpaw, Rawang, Lisu, Lawngwaw, Lachik \u2014 and that “Kachin” is just a construct by Jinghpaw-Christians to control everyone else. The same logic would apply to “Chin” (only Khumi, Asho, Zo, etc. “really” exist) and to Rakhine as well. So the question becomes: if we go down this path of dissecting identity and sub-identity, are we just going to end up doing “Divide, Disrupt & Dominance” to each other?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Maung Htun:<\/strong> When discussing identity politics, we need clarity on whether the goal is unity or separation. The “3D” approach (Divide, Disrupt & Dominance) is an old, worn-out colonial-era tool that the military has also relied on throughout its history. Since the coup, alongside the “Bamar chauvinism” narrative, claims have surfaced that groups like the Yaw and Dawei within the broader Bamar\/Myanmar category are actually entirely separate peoples. These groups do have genuinely distinct identity features \u2014 that’s real \u2014 but people shouldn’t forget that behind “we’re completely different” narratives, the 3D strategy is often at work, eventually leading to separate armed groups and open questions of unification vs. secession (most visibly in the Yaw region). He repeats Phyo Win Latt’s identity-fragmentation point, then adds: we should weigh carefully whether this approach is actually correct. If it is, it should be applied reciprocally by all sides \u2014 but people shouldn’t forget the 3D strategy is “dirty, dangerous, and demeaning,” and that its long-term harms tend to accompany its benefits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Phyo Win Latt (2nd comment):<\/strong> The Yaw forming their own YLA and separating from the NUG’s umbrella for their national liberation is, in his view, a genuinely correct political path \u2014 since the current revolution isn’t just about toppling the dictatorship or one party regaining power, but is a struggle for every ethnic group’s self-determination. He argues the Panglong Agreement’s historical error was recognizing only eight major ethnic groups while ignoring others with distinct identities, so it’s natural for every distinct group to now chart its own course. He extends this logic fully to the Rohingya: given their history of persecution and genocide, as long as they remain dependent on NUG policy or other regional armed groups, genuine Rohingya self-determination will never materialize \u2014 it could simply get absorbed into someone else’s agenda. He argues it’s time for Rohingyas to build their own independent armed revolutionary organization around Rohingya identity, rather than waiting for others’ recognition, following the Yaw’s example of leading their own political-military struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Is fragmenting rights-claims by sub-group the right strategy? \u2014 the case for and against<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

This is a real strategic debate in ethnic-conflict and self-determination literature, and serious people land on both sides. Here’s the balanced picture:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arguments in favor of groups asserting distinct, separate claims (the Phyo Win Latt \/ Rohingya-YLA line):<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n