{"id":6880,"date":"2026-07-11T12:40:01","date_gmt":"2026-07-11T12:40:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/myanmarmuslim.news\/en\/?p=6880"},"modified":"2026-07-11T12:40:30","modified_gmt":"2026-07-11T12:40:30","slug":"weaponized-xenophobia-myanmars-military-between-sinophobia-and-islamophobia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/myanmarmuslim.news\/en\/2026\/07\/11\/weaponized-xenophobia-myanmars-military-between-sinophobia-and-islamophobia\/","title":{"rendered":"Weaponized Xenophobia: Myanmar\u2019s Military Playing Between Sinophobia and Islamophobia"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Weaponized Xenophobia: Myanmar\u2019s Military Between Beijing, Moscow, and Delhi<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yangon \u2014<\/strong> Myanmar\u2019s military has long manipulated xenophobia \u2014 Sinophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-minority sentiment \u2014 as a political instrument. From the Mao badge riots of 1967 to the Rohingya genocide of the 2010s, these campaigns have not only shaped domestic politics but also Myanmar\u2019s foreign alignments. Today, Min Aung Hlaing\u2019s junta continues this tradition, leveraging hostility toward China while courting Russia and India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1967: Mao Badges and Riots<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Eyewitness accounts, such as Nyunt Nyunt Tin\u2019s memory of Rangoon students wearing Mao jackets and carrying Little Red Books, show how China\u2019s Cultural Revolution export<\/strong> triggered unrest. The June 1967 riots killed dozens to hundreds of Chinese residents, destroyed property, and ended the \u201cPauk Phaw\u201d friendship. Beijing retaliated by backing the Communist Party of Burma<\/strong> insurgency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2011: Myitsone Dam Protests<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Myitsone Dam protests<\/strong> reflected fears of Chinese economic domination. Thein Sein\u2019s government suspended the project, but analysts noted that the military tolerated Sinophobia to rebalance ties with Beijing and court Western support during Myanmar\u2019s political opening.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rohingya Genocide and Pipelines<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Weaponized xenophobia extended to Islamophobia. The Rohingya genocide<\/strong> cleared land for the Kyaukpyu\u2013Kunming oil and gas pipelines<\/strong>, securing China\u2019s corridor to the Bay of Bengal. By displacing Rohingya communities, the military facilitated infrastructure crucial to Beijing\u2019s Belt and Road ambitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s Tactical Pullbacks<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Beijing has since pulled back affiliated forces<\/strong> from areas like Lashio<\/strong> and Mogoke<\/strong>, recalibrating support for ethnic armed groups such as the Wa, Kokang, and Palaung within the Northern Alliance<\/strong>. This reflects China\u2019s balancing act: maintaining leverage while avoiding direct confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Min Aung Hlaing\u2019s Outreach to Russia and India<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Facing Chinese pressure, Min Aung Hlaing<\/strong> has sought alternative patrons. He approached Russia<\/strong> for arms and diplomatic backing, and also visited India<\/strong> to engage Prime Minister Modi. India\u2019s strategic rivalry with China made it a natural partner for Myanmar\u2019s military, particularly in counterbalancing Beijing\u2019s influence in northern Myanmar and the Bay of Bengal. This triangulation \u2014 playing China, Russia, and India against each other \u2014 underscores how xenophobia at home is paired with opportunistic diplomacy abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Islamophobia as a Domestic Political Weapon<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Internal Political Game: Islamophobia Against DASSK and the NLD<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

After the USDP\u2019s electoral losses<\/strong>, the military and its allied nationalist networks (especially Ma Ba Tha<\/strong>) launched campaigns of anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim rhetoric<\/strong>. The aim was to discredit the NLD<\/strong> and Aung San Suu Kyi<\/strong> as \u201csoft\u201d on Muslims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Initially, the NLD resisted. But as the pressure mounted, DASSK and her party acted like traditional Burmese boxers \u2014 the losing fighter hugging the opponent to survive. They joined the Islamophobic bandwagon<\/strong>, protecting themselves in domestic elections but sacrificing credibility abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This maneuver allowed the military to dominate the narrative. Internationally, DASSK\u2019s reputation collapsed, especially after the Rohingya genocide<\/strong>. Domestically, however, the NLD survived the electoral battlefield \u2014 until the 2021 coup<\/strong>, when the generals claimed the ultimate victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Weaponized Xenophobia: Dual Tracks<\/h2>\n\n\n\n