{"id":6538,"date":"2026-06-28T07:42:31","date_gmt":"2026-06-28T07:42:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/myanmarmuslim.news\/en\/?p=6538"},"modified":"2026-06-28T07:42:31","modified_gmt":"2026-06-28T07:42:31","slug":"the-hidden-hand-still-free-than-shwe-min-aung-hlaing-and-myanmars-unbroken-chain-of-military-power","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/myanmarmuslim.news\/en\/2026\/06\/28\/the-hidden-hand-still-free-than-shwe-min-aung-hlaing-and-myanmars-unbroken-chain-of-military-power\/","title":{"rendered":"The Hidden Hand Still Free: Than Shwe, Min Aung Hlaing, and Myanmar’s Unbroken Chain of Military Power"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Based on an original analysis by Ko Ko Gyi \u2014 translated, edited, and updated to June 2026<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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I. The Lone Ruler Behind the Curtain<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Senior General Than Shwe ruled Myanmar’s armed forces and the nation singlehandedly for nearly two decades \u2014 from 23 April 1992 to 30 March 2011. For nineteen years, he was the unchallenged master of the Tatmadaw and the state, a figure whose patience, cunning, and ruthlessness exceeded anything his predecessors had managed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He rose not through battlefield glory but through the military’s psychological warfare and propaganda apparatus. When the ailing General Saw Maung stepped aside in April 1992, Than Shwe assumed control of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) \u2014 having, in effect, engineered the palace coup that removed his own superior. He had done the same to Ne Win before that. He understood, from personal experience, exactly what ambitious subordinates were capable of.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That awareness shaped everything that followed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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II. Neutralising the Number Two<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The first order of business for any strongman is his deputy. General Maung Aye was Than Shwe’s number two, and a potentially formidable rival. Rather than confront him directly, Than Shwe chose a subtler approach: he promoted and elevated a series of lower-ranking generals \u2014 call them 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E \u2014 granting each of them near-equal rank and authority, and positioning them to counterbalance one another. No single officer could accumulate enough institutional weight to stage a coup. Collective loyalty replaced individual dependence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most dangerous figure among Than Shwe’s subordinates was not Maung Aye, however. It was General Khin Nyunt \u2014 the head of military intelligence, Prime Minister, and Secretary-1 of the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, formerly SLORC). Khin Nyunt was brilliant, well-connected internationally, and possessed of a power base in military intelligence that operated almost as a state within a state. In October 2004, Than Shwe moved against him: Khin Nyunt was dismissed, placed under house arrest, and eventually given a suspended sentence. His entire military intelligence apparatus was dissolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When the 2007 Saffron Revolution brought mass international pressure down on Myanmar’s junta, Than Shwe recognised that his continued visibility as supreme leader had become a liability. He made a decisive calculation: to disappear from the spotlight while retaining the real strings of power \u2014 to become, in effect, an invisible puppet master operating from behind the curtain. But first, he had to learn from the fates of those he had himself destroyed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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III. Avoiding the Fate of Ne Win and Saw Maung<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Than Shwe was acutely aware of what happened to Myanmar’s military leaders when they outlived their usefulness. He himself had betrayed both Ne Win and Saw Maung through palace coups, and then kept both men under house arrest until they died. He had no intention of suffering the same fate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His exit strategy was therefore planned with characteristic care. He did not simply retire \u2014 he engineered a collective departure. He ensured that his number two, General Maung Aye, resigned alongside him, eliminating any residual challenger from within the existing command structure. He then distributed power across a carefully selected group of figures who were each given near-equal standing: President U Thein Sein, Parliament Speaker U Shwe Mann, Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, USDP Chairman U Htay Oo, and ministers U Aung Thaung and U Aung Min. The design was explicit: no single figure would be powerful enough to move against the others \u2014 or against Than Shwe himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The result was a managed transition \u2014 the 2008 Constitution, the 2010 election, the nominally civilian government from 2011 \u2014 in which Than Shwe remained the unseen force. He had written the rules of the game, and he was not leaving the board.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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IV. The Good Cop \/ Bad Cop Game \u2014 and When It Failed<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

For a time, the strategy worked brilliantly. Than Shwe’s arrangement produced what political analysts recognise as the classic “good cop \/ bad cop” or “soft gang \/ hard gang” performance: reformists like Thein Sein and Aung Min handled international engagement and democratic optics, while hardliners managed internal repression. Myanmar’s image on the world stage softened considerably between 2011 and 2015. Western governments eased sanctions. Investment flowed. Aung San Suu Kyi was released and participated in the April 2012 by-elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then came the problem. The NLD won those by-elections in a landslide \u2014 43 of 44 contested seats. It became apparent that if the 2015 General Election proceeded at the current pace of reform, the USDP would be routed and the NLD would form the government. Than Shwe’s carefully constructed political architecture \u2014 designed to keep real power within a military-aligned orbit \u2014 was at risk of being bypassed entirely through the ballot box.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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V. The Manufactured Crisis: 969, Ma Ba Tha, and the Anti-Muslim Riots<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Faced with this threat, Than Shwe activated his right-hand man, U Aung Thaung, and the network of organised thugs known as the Swan Arr Shin (“Masters of Force”). The plan was to manufacture social chaos sufficient to destabilise the reform process and discredit the NLD’s political momentum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The instrument chosen was anti-Muslim violence. Using a combination of Swan Arr Shin operatives and monks who had been cultivated by military intelligence \u2014 what Ko Ko Gyi’s original analysis calls “ex-MI monks” \u2014 the 969 Buddhist nationalist movement was created and spread across the country. It subsequently evolved into Ma Ba Tha (the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion), which became the organisational vehicle for sustained anti-Muslim agitation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The results were devastating. The Taunggoke massacre, the Meiktila massacre of March 2013, and waves of anti-Muslim violence across multiple townships followed. The Rohingya of northern Rakhine State bore the worst of it \u2014 subjected to mass displacement, destruction of villages, and what the UN and international courts have since characterised as crimes against humanity and acts of genocide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ko Ko Gyi’s analysis is explicit: this was not spontaneous communal violence. It was a manufactured crisis, planned at the top of the military hierarchy, designed to destabilise the political environment and prevent a genuine democratic transition from taking hold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The broader anti-Muslim campaign was stalled in Mandalay, where the awareness and solidarity of Buddhist monks, civil society, and citizens of both faiths prevented the violence from fully taking root \u2014 a rare example of grassroots resistance checking the military’s provocateurs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VI. The Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 Who Copied the Playbook<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Min Aung Hlaing was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services in 2011 \u2014 one of Than Shwe’s carefully calibrated appointments. He was selected in part precisely because he was not a combat general with an independent power base, but an officer with administrative and political experience who could be managed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He proved harder to manage than expected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 1 February 2021, just as Myanmar’s democratically elected parliament was scheduled to convene following the NLD’s second landslide victory, Min Aung Hlaing launched a coup, arresting State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and dozens of elected officials. He appointed himself Chairman of the newly formed State Administration Council (SAC) and, within months, Prime Minister as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the years that followed, he reproduced Than Shwe’s toolkit with striking fidelity:<\/p>\n\n\n\n