{"id":6004,"date":"2026-05-30T13:47:22","date_gmt":"2026-05-30T13:47:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/myanmarmuslim.news\/en\/?p=6004"},"modified":"2026-05-30T13:53:34","modified_gmt":"2026-05-30T13:53:34","slug":"the-cat-who-lost-its-appetite-stumbled-upon-a-myna-bird-with-a-broken-wing-politics-%e1%80%80%e1%80%bc%e1%80%b1%e1%80%ac%e1%80%84%e1%80%ba%e1%80%81%e1%80%b6%e1%80%90%e1%80%bd%e1%80%84","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/myanmarmuslim.news\/en\/2026\/05\/30\/the-cat-who-lost-its-appetite-stumbled-upon-a-myna-bird-with-a-broken-wing-politics-%e1%80%80%e1%80%bc%e1%80%b1%e1%80%ac%e1%80%84%e1%80%ba%e1%80%81%e1%80%b6%e1%80%90%e1%80%bd%e1%80%84\/","title":{"rendered":"The cat who lost its appetite stumbled upon a myna bird with a broken wing-POLITICS ” \u200b\u1000\u103c\u1031\u102c\u1004\u103a\u1001\u1036\u1010\u103d\u1004\u103a\u1038\u1015\u103b\u1000\u103a (\u1014\u1032\u1037\u1007\u101b\u1000\u103a\u1010\u1031\u102c\u1004\u103a\u1015\u1014\u103a\u1000\u103b\u102d\u102f\u1038) \u1014\u102d\u102f\u1004\u103a\u1004\u1036\u1001\u103c\u102c\u1038\u200b\u101b\u1031\u1038\u1019\u1030\u101d\u102b\u1012"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This is a Burmese idiom describing a stroke of undeserved, opportunistic luck<\/strong> \u2014 someone who was already failing or weakened, yet accidentally lands an easy prize they didn’t earn through skill or merit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The layers of meaning in the context of this essay are razor-sharp:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A failing, illegitimate military dictator \u2014 who has lost all moral and political taste \u2014 stumbles upon India, which despite its grand ambitions is hobbled and desperate enough to be caught. The junta didn’t earn this diplomatic prize. India handed itself over.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25a0 It is truly bewildering that the first overseas trip of a military dictator \u2014 who seized the presidency through an election that fell far short of democratic standards \u2014 was to the world’s most populous democracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25a0 Geopolitically speaking, Naypyidaw and New Delhi have always shared a common desire to counterbalance Beijing’s influence. This holds true regardless of whether the government in question is the democratic NLD or the military junta.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other single-party states (e.g., China) and semi-democratic nations (e.g., Thailand, Singapore) are still cautiously assessing the situation and conditioning their recognition on benchmarks \u2014 applying pressure on Min Aung Hlaing \u2014 yet India, without issuing a single demand, rushed to throw open its arms and welcome the self-styled new “President.” It couldn’t even manage to ask a single word about Aung San Suu Kyi’s condition. Even if realpolitik makes full disengagement impossible, India gave away the prize of legitimacy for free, without extracting even a small concession in return \u2014 that is simply embarrassing. It also betrays a lack of genuine goodwill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was openly celebrated across New Delhi’s political circles, the Indian embassy, and the media as “practical politics” capable of countering Beijing \u2014 a spectacle one cannot look away from.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25a0 India is neither a Great Power nor quite a Middle Power \u2014 it exists in an emerging space somewhere between the two. It has not yet built a sphere of influence the way the US or China have, yet it refuses to become a follower state like Middle Powers, preferring instead to practice Strategic Autonomy<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is why, despite being a QUAD member to counter Chinese influence, India maintains a deep strategic partnership with Russia. It buys Iranian oil in non-dollar currencies, is friends with Israel \u2014 Netanyahu even calls Modi “brother” \u2014 and is a founding member of BRICS. In short, India will not stand 100% with any one side among the US, China, or Russia; it is building its own great-power axis. Its foreign policy is purely self-interest driven. Its biggest competitor is China, and its most immediate threat comes from China’s ally, Pakistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25a0 Three key pillars shape India’s policy toward Myanmar:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. Countering Chinese influence<\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Border stability<\/strong> \u2014 The Seven Sisters (India’s northeastern states) have distinct ethnic and historical identities from the Indian mainland; keeping them stable is critical for New Delhi.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. Implementing the Look East \/ Act East Policy<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    Beijing fears American encirclement under the China Containment<\/em> strategy; India equally fears being surrounded by neighbors tilting toward China. China-centrism causes anxiety in New Delhi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    India has little room to find partners. So it grabs opportunities as they come, pushing morality aside in favor of pragmatism. It builds ties with the Taliban to keep Pakistan in check, buys discounted energy from Russia and Iran, and fears its eastern neighbor Myanmar becoming completely absorbed into China’s orbit \u2014 which is why it shook hands with Min Aung Hlaing even faster than Beijing did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    It is also worth recalling that when Min Aung Hlaing was Commander-in-Chief, his first foreign trip was not to China but to Vietnam. As a general, he had confrontations with the Kokang \u2014 a residual unease toward Beijing that never fully disappeared.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u25a0 India has enormous ambitions running through<\/em> Myanmar. The Act East<\/em> policy requires passing through Myanmar. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project<\/strong> for the Seven Sisters requires Myanmar. The India\u2013Myanmar\u2013Thailand Trilateral Highway<\/strong> needs to be built through Myanmar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Even if you build the school only after securing the land, India still has to deal with whoever sits in Naypyidaw. So it does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u25a0 Currently, the Kaladan river corridor is controlled by the Arakan Army (AA)<\/strong>, and the border town of Rhi (Rih\/Zowkhawtar) is not in the military’s hands. The Mizoram state government has ethnic sympathy for the AA’s kin communities, but New Delhi’s central government sees things differently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    New Delhi’s primary concern is suppressing separatist armed groups in its northeastern states. It fears conflict from Myanmar spilling across the border, and dreads China\u2013Myanmar arms supply routes opening up to Indian insurgents. India and Myanmar’s military have had joint operations going back to the SLORC era precisely for this reason.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u25a0 Right now, the military is conducting large-scale offensives through Chin State, effectively severing the AA-controlled Rakhine corridor. This will inevitably cause civilian suffering. But strategically, Rakhine is vital \u2014 the military wants to cut the trade routes running from Paletwa (Chin State) through India’s border crossings, which the AA now controls.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    During this trip, there is a basis for both sides to negotiate two things at once: the junta’s plan to seal the corridor before retaking the Rakhine coastline, and India’s long-term desire to revive the Kaladan project.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Just yesterday, the AA announced near-total control of Rakhine \u2014 this may also be a message to New Delhi. Whether New Delhi heard it is another matter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u25a0 Beyond this, other agenda items likely included arms procurement and investment deals, to ensure Myanmar doesn’t become wholly dependent on Beijing. Both sides will try to maintain a balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u25a0 As for the AA: if the junta and New Delhi conspire together, the AA may have already prepared the Yunnan (Kunming) route \u2014 as it once learned from its mentor, the KIA. The AA’s slow advance in Kyaukphyu township, even as it swept through others, is no coincidence. It is difficult to cross a line where Beijing’s deep investments sit \u2014 until Beijing gives the green light.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The AA’s current leadership, despite the Rakhine people’s fierce pride, is impressively calculating and pragmatic. Whether as enemy or partner, one must handle them with great care.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u25a0 For pro-democracy forces, India’s actions are cause for sadness, not rage. Awareness is necessary; bitterness is not. This is what realpolitik looks like \u2014 knowing it is enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Myanmar cannot afford to make enemies of China, India, or the United States simultaneously. Even if the Spring Revolution succeeds and a democratic government comes to power, it will still have to embrace Xi, Modi, and Trump \u2014 with a wide smile \u2014 whenever opportunity allows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    (That said, India is arguably more reckless in foreign policy than the US or China, and its territorial ambitions make it more belligerent \u2014 one should not forget this.)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In the future, China will remain Myanmar’s largest trade partner and political influencer. Whether we like it or not, Myanmar will have to open channels with New Delhi, Washington, and Tokyo to counterbalance Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Furthermore, if China faces containment elsewhere \u2014 or feels pressure from US\u2013India forces in the Bay of Bengal \u2014 it may escalate its footprint inside Myanmar. In that scenario, the Great Powers won’t clash directly; the small nations in between will be the ones who suffer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u25a0 Pro-democracy forces have been looking toward distant America while nearby China was being pushed closer to the junta. India will shake hands with whoever comes to Naypyidaw \u2014 it has little leverage for Myanmar’s sake. Its responses will mostly be knee-jerk reactions<\/em> to China anxiety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Min Aung Hlaing, with his northeastern historical baggage, is trying to pull New Delhi and Washington closer while somehow also distancing himself from Beijing \u2014 is that even possible?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u25a0 Someone who plays the tom-cat-in-the-hollow-mortar, burns bridges with relatives, practices “rotten-bean diplomacy,” and now tries to split four ways with a pilgrimage to Gaya \u2014 he may yet make another wrong move. When he does, only those already in position will take advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Each side must make clear what it can deliver now and promise for the future \u2014 and then prove<\/em> it. How much stability and guarantee of interests can you credibly offer? As the White House would say: your Trump Card<\/strong> is what matters. If you don’t have one yet, find one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Even the world’s largest democracy openly practices realpolitik with a straight face. For those still struggling to build democracy from scratch, there is no reason to flinch from practical politics either.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Put it all together: a broken mortar meets a broken wing, a war veteran meets a village left behind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n\n\n\n

    Editorial Analysis<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    This essay by Augustus Linn is a sharp, lucid piece of strategic commentary \u2014 written in the tradition of Burmese political realism. Several key observations deserve highlighting:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Strengths of the argument:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n