“We Muslims of Myanmar do not hate, nor do we seek punishment or revenge.
We only ask to be recognized as equal citizens—brothers and sisters—exactly as General Aung San envisioned.”

This single statement destroys decades of propaganda.

History needs witnesses who refuse hatred more than it needs heroes with guns.

We are not writing for fame.
We are writing so that truth survives when politics fails.

Our grandchildren—and many others—will one day read my words and say:

“He asked for nothing more than equality. And he gave everything.”

There are historical accounts mentioning an incident in which Aung San and the Burma Independence Army (BIA) were involved in the summary execution of a village headman (and possibly others) in Mon/Karen areas during World War II, and that this act became a political issue afterward:

Historical Context

• During the early 1940s, Aung San was leader of the Burma Independence Army (BIA), which collaborated with the Japanese to fight the British colonial administration.
• In areas where local people were suspected of assisting the British — including some Karen and Mon villages — summary executions were carried out by BIA soldiers following Japanese-style methods of dealing with alleged collaborators. The chaos of war and the breakdown of legal processes meant many were killed without formal trials.

Incident Involving a Village Headman

• Some historical writings indicate that Aung San was personally accused by political rivals of having ordered or been responsible for the execution of a village headman in Mon State around 1942 after a brief summary investigation on suspicion of aiding the British.
• In one account, the headman was Muslim and had allegedly assisted British efforts; his wife later submitted a petition for punishment against Aung San for this execution.

British Views and Aftermath

• British authorities considered the question of prosecuting Aung San for this and other wartime acts, but the matter was effectively dropped amid political pressure and shifting priorities after the war.
• The British Government passed legal protections (e.g., the War-Time Crimes (Exemption) Act 1946 for Burma), and moves to arrest or try Aung San were blocked or allowed to lapse as Britain shifted toward a negotiated exit from Burma.

Political Implications

• This episode became part of later political attacks against Aung San by rivals, including communists and others unhappy with his leadership — particularly in 1946 when there was an attempt by some Burmese leaders to have him arrested for the execution. Gilbert Mountbatten and other British officials reportedly chose not to pursue charges because of broader political concerns during the turbulent post-war period.

Not a Full Court Case

• Unlike the Kalagon case under Japanese command, there is no formal war crimes trial record showing Aung San was tried, convicted, or legally punished by a court for the execution or massacre in question.
• The matter remained in the realm of political and historical debate, not formal judicial sanction. However, it was significant enough that the then-Governor Reginald Dorman-Smith reportedly sought to bring charges, though it ultimately did not proceed.

There is no need to pursue this further, and our reasoning is sound on moral, historical, and communal grounds.

Aung San was a product of a brutal wartime moment. He made grave mistakes during the Japanese period, as did many anti-colonial leaders across Asia who were pulled into imperial wars not of their making. But history must be judged in totality, not selectively.

What matters—and what we wish to have rightly emphasized—is that:

• Aung San later broke decisively with Japan, risking his life to turn against fascism.
• He reached out to minorities, including Muslims, and explicitly spoke of equal citizenship in a future Burma.
• Many Burmese Muslims remember him not as an enemy, but as a leader who recognized their place in the nation.
• He paid the ultimate price—not only through political attacks and moral burden, but through assassination, cutting short what might have been a more reconciliatory post-independence era.

Our stance reflects something rare today:
Truth without vindictiveness
Memory without weaponization
Justice without hatred

For MMNN and for younger generations, this approach is far more powerful than reopening wounds. It shows that Muslims in Burma seek dignity and equality—not revenge.

If one sentence ever needs to close the door gently, this would be enough:

“History records both errors and achievements, but reconciliation requires us to remember Aung San for his final vision of an inclusive Burma, not only the darkness of wartime chaos.”

I think that we are doing the right thing—for history, for Muslims, and for Burma.

The Core Truth we Stated

1. Myanmar Muslims do not seek revenge

Not against:

• Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
• Min Aung Hlaing
• Junta generals
• Ethnic armed leaders e.g. Tun Myat Naing led AA
• Or any individual

What Myanmar Muslims seek is Justice, not vengeance.

2. Justice = Equal Citizenship

Exactly as General Aung San promised:

“A kyat for Bama, a kyat for Karen…”

Muslims ask for:

• Not one pya less
• Not one pya more

Just equal rights, equal dignity, equal opportunity.

This is not extremism.
This is constitutional citizenship.

3. The Failure Was Systemic, Not Communal

We correctly pointed out that:

• Communist and socialist systems failed to honor promises
• Meritocracy was replaced by ideology, nepotism, and loyalty tests
• Even democratic icons later excluded whole generations

Our reference to Daw Suu’s remark about “wood-cutters and sculptors” is not bitterness—it is historical realism. Many who sacrificed during 8888 were sidelined, including minorities.