By DARZKKG

As Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing prepares to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin on August 31 at China’s invitation—and later the September 3 Victory Day parade in Beijing—serious questions are being raised about Beijing’s dual strategy: hosting the general as a guest of honor while simultaneously squeezing its most powerful ethnic ally, the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

Verified: China’s Pressure on the Wa

• Multiple Myanmar and regional outlets confirm that under Chinese pressure, the UWSA announced it has halted military and financial support to fellow ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP).
• Reports also confirm freezes on Wa-linked assets worth “billions of yuan” in Yunnan border hubs like Kunming and Ruili.
• These measures are widely understood as part of Beijing’s bid to rein in instability along its frontier and to force the Wa into compliance.

Alleged: Shanghai Properties and Vast Valuations

• Some independent sources allege that Wa leaders’ properties in Shanghai were also seized, with estimates of nearly 1 billion yuan confiscated and UWSA global assets exceeding US$80 billion.
• These specific claims remain unverified in Chinese state or major international reporting. What is confirmed is that significant Wa financial resources have been disrupted.

Why Beijing Moves This Way

China’s actions reflect its core priority: border stability. Hosting Min Aung Hlaing allows Beijing to project legitimacy for the junta, while asset seizures remind ethnic armies that ultimate control lies in Beijing’s hands. This is less about friendship with Nay Pyi Taw than about ensuring no actor in northern Myanmar can defy Chinese interests.

U.S., ASEAN, India, Bangladesh: Reluctance to Intervene

• The United States continues to rely on sanctions and diplomatic condemnation, but has shown no sign of providing military or logistical support to Myanmar’s resistance. Washington avoids direct confrontation with Beijing in a theater China views as vital.
• ASEAN remains bound by its doctrine of “non-interference,” deeply divided between members sympathetic to the junta and those critical of it.
• India prioritizes stability along its Northeast frontier and balances ties with both the junta and resistance, making it unlikely to endorse U.S.-backed action.
• Bangladesh focuses on the Rohingya crisis and border security, steering clear of great power competition over Myanmar.

For all, Myanmar remains a secondary theater overshadowed by Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Middle East.

Inside Myanmar: The Rise of the NRA

While geopolitics keeps external powers cautious, the ground reality inside Myanmar is shifting. People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) from Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay have moved toward coordination under a new Nationwide Revolution Alliance (NRA). If consolidated with the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and the National Unity Government (NUG), this could represent the embryo of a truly united front.

Such unity is vital. China’s divide-and-rule tactics are effective only so long as the resistance remains fragmented. The day Myanmar’s PDFs, EROs, and NUG speak with one voice, the junta will face an unstoppable force not reliant on the whims of external powers.

MMNN Policy View

1. Fact Check First: Reports of Wa properties seized in Shanghai and vast UWSA fortunes should be treated as unconfirmed, though China’s pressure is real and escalating.
2. Geopolitics Will Not Save Us: Neither the U.S., ASEAN, India, nor Bangladesh is willing to militarily “checkmate” the junta. Hopes of an outside savior are misplaced.
3. Unity Is the Only Path: The emergence of the NRA alongside EROs and the NUG is a crucial opportunity. Myanmar’s revolution must prioritize an effective unity government to succeed.
4. China Is Not a Friend: Beijing seeks stability on its own terms. Its current moves against the Wa show it will use both carrot and stick—but always to secure its interests, not Myanmar’s freedom.

Our conclusion:
Min Aung Hlaing’s red-carpet reception in China is not a triumph—it is a reminder that Myanmar’s fate will not be decided in Beijing, Washington, or Delhi. It will be decided in Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay, Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan, wherever people resist. Only through unity of the NRA, EROs, and NUG can Myanmar turn dreams of peace, prosperity, and progress into reality.