English translation of Thuta Zaw’s (သုတဇော်) post in Myanmar Now, November 6, 2025
DARZ-KKG
As the military has ceased operations in northern Shan State, the PDF forces that have become targets are gathering more. This shift is crucial to prevent a unified military response.
Thuta Zaw, Myanmar Now, November 6, 2025.
On the second anniversary of the “1027 Offensive,” which began in northern Shan State after a significant military defeat, the announcement from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) regarding a ceasefire due to Chinese government mediation has stirred considerable movement among revolutionary forces.
The primary issue causing this movement is not merely TNLA’s decision to not collaborate further in armed resistance against the military junta system but rather their agreement to surrender the towns of Moekok and Moemait, which were seized with significant revolutionary forces during the “Shan-Man Offensive,” back to the military without any conditions.
Under the supervision of the Chinese government, negotiations for a ceasefire between the TNLA and the military have been repeatedly conducted in Yunnan Province. After the ninth round of talks, the TNLA released a brief statement. There was no announcement from the military side.
In the TNLA statement, it was mentioned that “during the agreed period, the Ta’ang forces will withdraw from Moekok and Moemait townships, and the Myanmar military will refrain from airstrikes and assaults. Starting from October 29, 2025 (00:00), both sides signed an agreement for mutual cessation of hostilities at the agreed locations.”
The TNLA leaders did not merely capture these towns. They had established armed units with the help of TNLA to combat the military junta system after resisting the coup in 2021, which also included the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) operating under the National Unity Government (NUG).
However, at the time of the announcement of the ceasefire with the military junta, it appears that the PDF forces that had engaged in battles alongside them were not consulted or informed in advance and that decisions were made unilaterally. This situation is worse than the return of Lahe town to the military by the MNDAA.
A Complex Situation with Significant Impact
With the “Shan-Man Offensive,” major battles were fought by PDF forces that captured strategic areas in northern Shan State, including Moemait, Mottama, Sintku, and Thayekyin townships, which are adjacent to Mandalay Region. These forces include the Mandalay People’s Defense Force (MDY-PDF), Moekok Strategy, TRI Strategy, and the “PakaFa” (People’s Defense Force) under the NUG.
Following the TNLA’s announcement, these PDF forces also declared that they would protect their controlled areas within Mandalay Region and continue to engage in “federal democracy struggles and the dismantling of the military junta system.”
However, it is notable that all statements avoided directly opposing the TNLA’s ceasefire agreement and decisions regarding the return of the two towns. They did not clearly state their intention to prevent the military from regaining control of these towns.
Due to TNLA’s training assistance, the well-coordinated and organized forces may jeopardize the agreement between TNLA and the military, preparing to resist and prevent the military from regaining control of Moekok and Moemait towns. There is uncertainty whether they will merely inform the public of their differing political and military stances from TNLA. It remains to be seen.
The TNLA statement set a timeline for the withdrawal of their forces from the two towns, although it wasn’t explicitly detailed.
Some speculate that the new troops from MDY-PDF and TRI Strategy are rapidly gathering, with former soldiers being called back for the defense of these towns. If they are to protect Moekok and Moemait, they would first need to confront the military head-on alongside TNLA and allied PDF forces, which poses a significant risk.
When TNLA’s forces withdraw, MDY-PDF, Moekok Strategy, and TRI Strategy must ensure that the military does not regain control of the two towns without TNLA’s agreement. If they act otherwise, it could lead to the collapse of the ceasefire agreement signed by TNLA, and the military could launch attacks on other towns under TNLA’s control.
According to the current situation, MDY-PDF, Moekok Strategy, and TRI Strategy are prepared to continue resisting the military junta, thus diverging from the path of ceasefire chosen by TNLA.
The implication is that TNLA will find it difficult to allow PDF forces to establish bases in areas they control, to pass through those areas, to provide military supplies, and to continue training operations. These factors may be critical for any ceasefire agreement that TNLA has not publicly disclosed.
This is because, similar to the MNDAA and the military junta’s ceasefire arrangement, the Chinese government has likely pressured TNLA to avoid any interaction with NUG-PDF forces.
As a result, MDY-PDF, Moekok Strategy, and TRI Strategy will soon face the military’s encirclement and assaults on their current controlled territories. If they cannot resist the military’s attacks and are forced to withdraw, they will not be able to retreat to northern Shan. If those PDF forces must inevitably withdraw into TNLA’s controlled areas, the military will follow and crush them, and TNLA will not permit any PDF forces entering their territories to continue armed resistance.
In this way, Min Aung Hlaing’s strategy aims to prevent mutual support between PDF forces and the ethnic armed groups that have backed them since the Spring Revolution, isolating the PDFs and ultimately dismantling them without assistance.
This situation is well understood by the leaders of MNDAA and TNLA. Therefore, they are likely choosing to avoid aligning with the military junta’s dismantling efforts, believing that the Chinese government can protect their current interests by accepting mediation.
An Urgent Need for Coordination between Mandalay and Sagaing PDFs
MNDAA and TNLA, two major ethnic armed groups capable of striking the military junta effectively, have signed a ceasefire agreement under pressure from the Chinese government.
MNDAA and TNLA requested assistance for armed resistance against the military junta in their territories, and they provided training and armed support to thousands of PDF youths, organizing the “1027 Offensive,” which captured areas from the military in the Ta’ang region.
Now, they have begun to abandon PDF forces. Knowing that one group will cease fire while the other will be crushed by the military’s strategy, they are unable to escape from this situation. It is also observed that China continues to exert pressure for a ceasefire. Among the three groups leading the “1027 Offensive,” only one battalion continues to engage with the military. Currently, the PDFs emerging from the Spring Revolution are at an urgent point to unite.
Thus, MDY-PDF, Moekok Strategy, and TRI Strategy must avoid the situation where they are caught between the TNLA’s ceasefire and the military’s offensive. The time has come for the PDF groups within Sagaing Region to gather and create a strong alliance. Therefore, it appears that these groups are rapidly calling up new recruits.
The military junta, which has been unable to maintain control over northern Shan for the past five years, is now targeting and preparing to strike against the PDF forces in Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay. Currently, the MDY-PDF is engaged in clashes within its controlled areas in Mottama.
However, one of the military’s weaknesses is its focus on ensuring that their upcoming elections in December and January proceed smoothly. If PDF forces can coordinate their strategies effectively and exploit this military vulnerability, they may gain the upper hand against military offensives.
For this, it is crucial that PDF forces establish long-term, robust coordination to build a “unified strength” that the public can rely on, rather than merely focusing on immediate military engagements.
